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Abstract—Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat.
In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource con-
straints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop
robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize
game theory to understand the fundamental trade-offs involved.
Previous works in this direction, however, mainly focus on the
single-node case without considering strict resource constraints.
In this paper, a game-theoretic model for protecting a system of
multiple nodes against stealthy attacks is proposed. We consider
the practical setting where the frequencies of both attack and
defense are constrained by limited resources, and an asymmetric
feedback structure where the attacker can fully observe the
states of nodes while largely hiding its actions from the defender.
We characterize the best response strategies for both attacker
and defender in the space of both non-adaptive and adaptive
strategies, and study the Nash Equilibria of the game. We further
study a sequential game where the defender first announces its
strategy and the attacker then responds accordingly, and design
an algorithm that finds a nearly optimal strategy for the defender
to commit to.
Index Terms—Stealthy Attacks, Resource Constraints, Game
Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
The landscape of cyber security is constantly evolving in
response to increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks. In recent
years, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) [1] are becoming a
major cyber-security concern. APT attacks have several distin-
guishing properties that render traditional defense mechanisms
less effective. First, they are often launched by incentive
driven entities with specific targets. Second, they are persistent
in achieving the goals, and may involve multiple stages or
continuous operations over a long period of time. Third, they
are highly adaptive and stealthy, often operating in a “low-
and-slow” fashion [8] to avoid of being detected. In fact, some
of the past notorious attacks remained undetected for months
or longer [2], [7]. Hence, traditional intrusion detection and
prevention techniques that target one-shot and known attack
types are insufficient in the face of long-lasting and stealthy
attacks.
Moreover, there has been increased realization that security
failures in information systems are often caused by the misun-
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derstanding of incentives of the entities involved in the system
instead of the lack of proper technical mechanisms [6], [22].
To this end, game theoretical models have been extensively
applied to cyber security [4], [10], [11], [13], [16], [21], [28].
Game theory provides a proper framework to systematically
reason about the strategic behavior of each side, and gives
insights to the design of cost-effective defense strategies. Tra-
ditional game models, however, fail to capture the persistent
and stealthy behavior of advanced attacks. Further, they often
model the cost of defense (or attack) as part of the utility
functions of the players, while ignoring the strict resource
constraints during the play of the game. For a large system
with many components, ignoring such constraints can lead to
either over- or under-provisioning of resources, and revenue
loss.
In this paper, we study a two-player non-zero-sum game that
explicitly models stealthy attacks with resource constraints.
We consider a system with N independent nodes (or compo-
nents), an attacker, and a defender. Over a continuous time
horizon, the attacker (defender) determines when to attack
(recapture) a node, subject to a unit cost per action that varies
over nodes. At any time t, a node is either compromised or
protected, depending on whether the player that makes the
last move (i.e., action) towards it before t is the attacker or
the defender. A player obtains a value for each node under
its control per unit time, which again may vary over nodes.
The total payoff to a player is then the total value of the
nodes under its control over the entire time horizon minus the
total cost incurred, and we are interested in the long-term time
average payoffs.
To model stealthy attacks, we assume that the defender
gets no feedback about the attacker during the game. On
the other hand, the defender’s moves are fully observable
to the attacker. This is a reasonable assumption in many
cyber security settings, as the attacker can often observe and
learn the defender’s behavior before taking actions, while the
defender may not even be aware of the attacker’s existence.
Moreover, we explicitly model their resource constraints by
placing an upper bound on the frequency of moves (over all
the nodes) for each player. We consider both Nash Equilibrium
and Sequential Equilibrium for this game model. In the latter
case, we assume that the defender is the leader that first
announces its strategy, and the attacker then responds with
its best strategy. The sequential setting is often relevant in
cyber security, and can provide a higher payoff to the defender
compared with the Nash Equilibrium. To simplify the analysis,
we assume that the set of nodes are independent in the sense
2that the proper functioning of one node does not depend on
other nodes, which serves as a first-order approximation of the
more general setting of interdependent nodes to be considered
in our future work.
Our model is an extension of the asymmetric version of
the FlipIt game considered in [18]. The FlipIt game [29] is a
two-player non-zero-sum game recently proposed in response
to an APT attack towards RSA Data Security [3]. In the
FlipIt game, a single critical resource (a node in our model)
is considered. Each player obtains control over the resource
by “flipping” it subject to a cost. During the play of the
game, each player obtains delayed and possibly incomplete
feedback on the other player’s previous moves. A player’s
strategy is then when to move over a time horizon, and
the solution of the game heavily depends on the class of
strategies adopted and the feedback structure of the game. In
particular, a full analysis of Nash Equilibria has only been
obtained for two special cases, when both players employ a
periodic strategy [29], and when the attacker is stealthy and
the defender is observable as in our model [18]. However,
both works consider a single node and no resource constraints.
The multi-node setting together with the resource constraints
impose significant challenges in characterizing both Nash and
Sequential Equilibria. A different multi-node extension of the
FlipIt game is considered in [17] where the attacker needs to
compromise either all the nodes (AND model) or a single node
(OR model) to take over a system. However, only preliminary
analytic results are provided.
Our game model can be applied in various settings. One
example is key rotation. Consider a system with multiple
nodes, e.g., multiple communication links or multiple servers,
that are protected by different keys. From time to time, the
attacker may compromise some of the keys, e.g., by leverag-
ing zero-day vulnerabilities and system specific knowledge,
while remaining undetected from the defender. A common
practice is to periodically generate fresh keys by a trusted
key-management service, without knowing when they are
compromised. On the other hand, the attacker can easily detect
the expiration of a key (at an ignorable cost compared with re-
compromising it). Both key rotation and compromise incurs
a cost, and there is a constraint on the frequency of moves
at each side. There are other examples where our extension
of the FlipIt game can be useful, such as password reset and
virtual-machine refresh [9], [18], [29].
We have made following contributions in this paper.
• We propose a two-player game model with multiple inde-
pendent nodes, an overt defender, and a stealthy attacker
where both players have strict resource constraints in
terms of the frequency of protection/attack actions across
all the nodes.
• We prove that the periodic strategy is a best-response
strategy for the defender against an i.i.d. strategy of
the attacker among all non-adaptive strategies where the
distribution of the attacking time is fixed in advance.
Meanwhile, the i.i.d. strategy of the attacker is also
the best response against the periodic strategy for the
defender.
• We extend our result to the space of adaptive strategies
and show that the defender’s periodic strategy and at-
TABLE I
MAIN RESULTS
Attacker Defender
Best Response
i.i.d. attack ⇆ periodic defense
Markovian attack → periodic defense
i.i.d. attack 8 Markovian defense
Nash Equilibrium A complete characterization of NEs (6 types)
Sequential Game
Optimal attack A polynomial time
under a given algorithm for optimal
defense strategy (27) defense (Algorithm 1)
A→ B : B is the best response against A
A9 B : B is NOT the best response against A
tacker’s ı.i.d. strategy still remain optimal to each other
among all adaptive and non-adaptive strategies. We also
prove that periodic strategy is the best response against
Markovian attacking strategy, but the i.i.d. strategy may
not be the best response against Markovian defending
strategy.
• For the pair of periodic and i.i.d. strategies, we fully
characterize the set of Nash Equilibria of our game,
and show that there is always one (and maybe more)
equilibrium, for the case when the attack times are
deterministic.
• We further consider the sequential game with the de-
fender as the leader and the attacker as the follower.
We design a dynamic programming based algorithm
that identifies a nearly optimal strategy (in the sense of
subgame perfect equilibrium) for the defender to commit
to.
Table I summarizes the main results in this paper. The
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present our
game-theoretic model in Section III, and study best-response
strategies of both players in Section IV. Analysis of Nash
Equilibria of the game is provided in Section V, and the
sequential game is studied in Section VI. In Section VII,
we present numerical result, and we conclude the paper in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Game theory has been extensively applied to cyber-security
and network security [4], [10], [11], [13], [16], [21], [28].
However, traditional models mainly focus on known attacks
and largely ignore the budget constraints of both the defender
and the attacker.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our model is inspired by
the FlipIt game [9], [29] proposed in response to an APT attack
towards RSA Data Security [3], a non-zero-sum dynamic game
that explicitly models the stealthy takeover, but is restricted to
a single node. The FlipIt game is essentially a timing game
focusing on questions such as when to protect (attack) the
node and how often. In the original model, a player obtains
control over a component instantaneously by “flipping” it, and
obtains feedback only when it moves. Dominant strategies
or strongly dominant strategies are characterized for several
classes of periodic and renewable strategies, and some simple
examples of adaptive strategies. But the full analysis of
Nash Equilibrium is only provided when both the defender
3and the attacker employ a periodic strategy with a random
starting phase. Several variants of the basic model have been
studied [17], [18]. In particular, a multi-node extension is
considered in [17] where the attacker needs to compromise
either all the nodes (AND model) or a single node (OR
model) to take over a system. The authors name such a model
as “FlipThem”. However, only preliminary analytic results
are provided. Leslie et al. extend the “FlipThem” model in
[19], [20] where the attacker can obtain partial benefits by
compromising a certain number (larger than a threshold) of
nodes. Further, an extended model with a networked system
of multiple resources, called ”FlipNet”, is condisdered in [27].
An asymmetric model similar to ours where the attacker
is stealthy while the defender is observable is considered
in [18], where full Nash Equilibrium analysis is provided but
only for the single node setting. In [30], Zheng et al. use
multi-armed bandit model to investigate the optimal timing of
security updates against stealthy attacks. There are also some
behaviorial studies of the FlipIt game [24]. However, none of
the previous works considered an explicit resource constraint
on the players.
A different type of security game has also been studied in
the literature mainly for protecting physical infrastructure [5],
[14], [26], [28]. Essentially a mixed strategy Stackelberg game
is considered, where the defender is the leader and the attacker
is the follower. The key assumption is that the defender first
decides upon a randomized defense policy, and the attacker
then observes the randomized policy of the defender but not
its realization before taking an action. While this is a useful
assumption under certain scenarios, it may not hold when the
attacker is highly adaptive. In particular, since the attacker may
be able to observe the defender’s previous actions, it could take
an action before the defender changes its policy to get more
benefit. Moreover, the two-stage game is insufficient to capture
the persistent and stealthy behaviors of advanced attacks. In
spite of the fundamental differences of the two models, recent
work that extend this model to multiple defenders and bounded
rationality [12], [23] provide useful insights to our model as
well, which will be studied in our future work.
III. GAME MODEL
In this section, we discuss our two-player game model
including its information structure, the action spaces of both
attacker and defender, and their payoffs. Our game model
extends the single node model in [18] to multiple nodes and
includes a resource constraint on each player.
A. Basic Model
In our game-theoretical model, there are two players and a
network of N independent nodes1. Despite of the assumption
that each node is independent, the extension from single-
node case to multi-node case is still challenging due to the
difficulty of the generalized Nash Equilbrium problem (GNEP)
with non-convex strategy space. The player who is the lawful
user/owner of the N nodes is called the defender, while the
other player is called the attacker. The game starts at time
1The terms “components” and “nodes” are interchangeable in this paper.
Fig. 1. Game Model
t = 0 and goes to any time t = T . We assume that time is
continuous. A player can make a move at any time instance
subject to a cost per move. At any time t, a node is under the
control of the player that makes the last move towards the node
before t (see Figure 1). Each attack towards node i incurs a
cost of CAi to the attacker, and it takes a random period of time
αi,k to succeed. Throughout this paper, we assume αi,k is i.i.d.
across k, meaning the attacking time for one node follows the
same distribution among all attacks. On the other hand, when
the defender makes a move to protect node i, which incurs a
cost of CDi , node i is recovered immediately even if the attack
is still in process. Each node i has a value ri that represents
the benefit that the attacker receives from node i per unit of
time when node i is compromised.
In addition to the move cost, we introduce a strict resource
constraint for each player, which is a practical assumption but
has been ignored in most prior works on security games. In
particular, we place an upper bound on the average amount
of resource that is available to each player at any time (to
be formally defined below). As in typical security games,
we assume that ri, C
A
i , C
D
i , the distribution of αi,k, and the
budget constraints are all common knowledge of the game,
that is, they are known to both players. For instance, they can
be learned from history data and domain knowledge. Without
loss of generality, all nodes are assumed to be protected at
time t = 0. Table II summarizes the notations used in the
paper.
As in [18], we consider an asymmetric feedback model
where the attacker’s moves are stealthy, while the defenders’
moves are observable. More specifically, at any time, the
attacker knows the full history of moves by the defender, as
well as the state of each node, while the defender does not
know whether a node is compromised or not. This asymmetric
information structure is crucial in modeling the stealthy attack
in cyber security. Let Wi,k denote the time period the attacker
waits from the latest time when node i is recovered, to the
time when the attacker starts its k-th attack against node i.
On the contrary, the defender’s strategy is to determine the
time intervals between its (k− 1)-th move and k-th move for
each node i and k, denoted as Xi,k. Note that, both Wi,k and
Xi,k are random variables in general.
In this paper, we consider both non-adaptive and adaptive
strategies. We define the strategy space for the attacker as
all possible Wi,k ∀i, k which follow a joint distribution.
Similarly, the defender’s strategy space refers to all possible
Xi,k ∀i, k following a joint distribution. Since the defender
cannot observe the attacker’s behavior and node states, we
only need to consider non-adaptive strategies for the defender.
On the other hand, the attacker can observe the defender’s
4TABLE II
LIST OF NOTATIONS
Symbol Meaning
T time horizon
N number of nodes
ri value per unit of time of compromising node i
αi,k attacking time for node i in the k-th move
CAi attacker’s move cost for node i
CDi defender’s move cost for node i
Wi,k attacker’s waiting time in its k-th move for node i
Xi,k
time between the (k-1)-th and the k-th defense
for node i
B budget to the defender, greater than 0
M budget to the attacker, greater than 0
mi frequency of defenses for node i
pi
probability of immediate attack on node i
after it recovers
Li the number of defense moves for node i
moves. Thus in general, Wi,k may depend on the realization
of both Xj,τ and Wj,τ s.t. Tj(τ) < Ti(k) where Tj(τ) refers
to the time of node j’s τ -th defense.
B. Defender’s Problem
Consider a fixed period of time T and let Li denote the
total number of defense moves towards node i during T . Li
is a random variable in general. The total amount of time
when node i is compromised is then T −
∑Li
k=1 min(Wi,k +
αi,k, Xi,k) wheremin(Wi,k+αi,k, Xi,k) refers to the time that
the attacker spends to attack node i after the k-th’s defense.
Moreover, the total cost for defending node i is LiC
D
i . The
defender’s payoff is then defined as the total loss (non-positive)
minus the total defense cost over all the nodes. Given the
attacker’s strategy {Wi,k}, the defender faces the following
optimization problem:
max
{Xi,k},Li
E
[ N∑
i=1
(−(T −∑Lik=1 min(Wi,k + αi,k, Xi,k)) · ri
T
−
LiC
D
i
T
)]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Li
T
≤ B w.p.1
Li∑
k=1
Xi,k ≤ T w.p.1 ∀i
(1)
The first constraint requires that the average number of nodes
that can be protected at any time is upper bounded by a
constant B. The second constraint defines the feasible set
of Xi,k. Since T is given, the expectation in the objective
function can be moved into the summation in the numerator.
C. Attacker’s Problem
We again let Li denote the total number of defense moves
towards node i in T . The total cost of attacking i is then
(
∑Li
k=1 1Wi,k<Xi,k) · C
A
i , where 1Wi,k<Xi,k = 1 if Wi,k <
Xi,k and 1Wi,k<Xi,k = 0 otherwise. It is important to note
that when Wi,k ≥ Xi,k, the attacker actually gives up its
k-th attack against node i (this is possible as the attacker
can observe when the defender moves). Given the defender’s
strategy, the attacker’s problem can be formulated as follows,
where M is an upper bound on the average number of nodes
that the attacker can attack at any time instance.
max
Wi,k
E
[ N∑
i=1
(T −
∑Li
k=1 min(Wi,k + αi,k, Xi,k)) · ri
T
−
(
∑Li
k=1 1Wi,k<Xi,k) · C
A
i
T
]
s.t. E
[
N∑
i=1
1
T
∫ T
0
vi(t)dt
]
≤M
(2)
where vi(t) = 1 if the attacker is attacking node i at time t and
vi(t) = 0 otherwise. Note that we make the assumption that
the attacker has to keep consuming resources when the attack
is in progress instead of making an instantaneous move like
the defender; hence it has a different form of budget constraint.
On the other hand, we assume that CAi captures the total cost
for each attack on node i, which is independent of the attack
time. We further have the following equation:∫ T
0
vi(t)dt =
Li∑
k=1
(min(Wi,k + αi,k, Xi,k)−min(Wi,k, Xi,k))
(3)
IV. BEST RESPONSES
In this section, we analyze the best-response strategies for
both players. Our main result is that when the attacker employs
an i.i.d. strategy, a periodic strategy is a best response for
the defender, and vice versa. To prove this result, however,
we have provided characterization of best responses in more
general settings.
A. Defender’s Best Response
We first show that for the defender’s problem (1), an optimal
deterministic strategy is also optimal in general. We then
provide a sufficient condition for a deterministic strategy to
be optimal against any non-adaptive attacks. Finally, we show
that periodic defense is optimal against i.i.d. attacks.
Lemma IV.1. Suppose x⋆i,k and l
⋆
i are the optimal solutions
of (1) among all deterministic strategies, then they are also
optimal among all the strategies.
Proof. Consider a general defense strategy Xi,k, we define
xi,k and li as the realizations of Xi,k and Li respectively and
let C = {(xi,k, li)|
∑N
i=1
li
T
≤ B and
∑li
k=1 xi,k ≤ T }. Let
UD(Xi,k, Li) denote the target function of (1) and denote
UˆD(xi,k, li)
=
N∑
i=1
−
(
T −
∑li
k=1 E[min(Wi,k + αi,k, xi,k)]
)
· ri − liCDi
T
(4)
5Since the defender cannot observe the attacker’s behavior,
any realization of Xi,k can be pre-determined. Thus, we can
compute the total expected payoff for defender as follows:
UD(Xi,k, Li)
= P (Xi,k = x
⋆
i,k Li = l
⋆
i , ∀i, k) · Uˆ
D(x⋆i,k, l
⋆
i )
+
∑
(xi,k, li)∈C
xi,k 6=X
⋆
i,k
li 6=L
⋆
i
P (Xi,k = xi,k Li = li, ∀i, k) · Uˆ
D(xi,k, li)
≤ UˆD(x⋆i,k, l
⋆
i )
(5)
The equality holds only whenXi,k = x
⋆
i,k Li = l
⋆
i ∀i, k w.p.1.
Therefore, x⋆i,k and l
⋆
i are also optimal among all the de-
fender’s strategies.
According to the lemma, it suffices to consider defender’s
strategies where both Xi,k and Li,k are deterministic. It is also
worth mentioning that the order in which nodes are defended
makes no difference since the nodes are independent of each
other.
Definition IV.1. For a given Li, we define a set Xi including
all deterministic defense strategies for node i with the follow-
ing properties:
1)
∑Li
k=1Xi,k = T ;
2) FWi,k+αi,k(Xi,k) = FWi,j+αi,j (Xi,j) ∀k, j,
where FWi,k+αi,k(·) is the marginal CDF of Wi,k + αi,k.
Note that Xi can be an empty set in general due to the
randomness of Wi,k + αi,k. Meanwhile, for deterministic
Xi,k, Wi,k is independent of any Xj,τ s.t. Tj(τ) ≥ Ti(k).
The following lemma shows that when Xi is non-empty for
all i, any strategy that belongs to Xi is the defender’s best
deterministic strategy against a non-adaptive attacker.
Lemma IV.2. When the attacker’s strategy is non-adaptive,
for any given set of {Li} with
∑N
i=1
Li
T
≤ B, if Xi 6= ∅ ∀i,
then any set of {Xi,k} which belongs to Xi ∀i, is the defender’s
best deterministic strategy.
Proof. We first define the defender’s payoff for node i as
UDi (Xi,k, Li) =
−
(
T −
∑Li
k=1E[min(Wi,k + αi,k, Xi,k)]
)
· ri
T
−
LiC
D
i
T
.
(6)
Since {Li} are fixed, Problem (1) can be divided into N
independent sub-problems as follows:
max
Xi,k
UDi (Xi,k)
s.t.
Li∑
k=1
Xi,k ≤ T
(7)
Since the attacking strategy is non-adaptive, meaning that
Xi,k is independent of Wi,k, we can take double derivatives
of UDi ({Xi,k}) with respect to Xi,k to obtain the following
∂2UDi (Xi,k)
∂X2i,k
=


−
fWi,k+αi,k (Xi,1)
T
0 · · · 0
0 −
fWi,k+αi,k (Xi,2)
T
· · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · −
fWi,k+αi,k (Xi,Li )
T


(8)
where fWi,k+αi,k(·) is the marginal p.d.f. of Wi,k + αi,k.
It follows that the objective function is concave because the
above matrix is a non-positive definite matrix. Here, we as-
sume that FWi,k+αi,k(Xi,k) is continuous. However, concavity
can still be proved in general using the subgradient concept.
Since UDi (Xi,k) is concave and continuously differentiable,
the KKT conditions are both sufficient and necessary. From
the KKT conditions, we have ν⋆(
∑Li
k=1Xi,k − T ) = 0 and
FWi,k+αi,k(Xi,k) = FWi,j+αi,k(Xi,j), ∀k, j, where ν
⋆ is the
Lagrangian multiplier. It is clear that UDi (Xi,k) is maximized
when the constraint is tight, that is,
∑Li
k=1Xi,k = T . However,
there may exist a set of Xi,k s.t.
∑Li
k=1Xi,k < T but it is still
optimal for (7). Thus, the two conditions in Definition IV.1
are only sufficient.
Lemma IV.2 gives a sufficient condition for a deterministic
defense strategy to be optimal. Intuitively, the defender tries
to equalize its expected loss in each period in a deterministic
way, which gives the defender the most stable system to avoid
a big loss in any particular period. We then show that a
periodic defense is sufficient when the attacker employs an
i.i.d. strategy formally defined below.
Definition IV.2. An attack strategy is called i.i.d. if it is non-
adaptive, and Wi,k is independent across i and is i.i.d. across
k.
Theorem IV.1. A periodic strategy is the best response among
all strategies for the defender if the attacker employs an i.i.d.
strategy.
Proof. For any fixed {Li}, let Xi , [
T
Li
T
Li
· · · T
Li
]. It is easy
to check that {Xi} satisfies the fist property in Definition IV.1
and will satisfy the second property if αi,k is i.i.d. with
respect to k. According to Lemma IV.2, {Xi} is an optimal
(deterministic) solution respecting {Li}. It follows that if we
let {L⋆i } denote the optimal solution of
max
Li
N∑
i=1
−
(
T −
∑Li
k=1 E[min(Wi,k + αi,k,
T
Li
)]
)
· ri − LiCDi
T
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Li
T
≤ B
then X⋆i , [
T
L⋆i
T
L⋆i
· · · T
L⋆i
] is an optimal solutions to the
defender’s problem. Hence, a periodic strategy with periods of
X⋆i for all i is a best-response strategy for the defender.
According to the theorem, the periodic strategy gives the
defender the most stable system when the attacker adopts
6the i.i.d. strategy. Since the attacker’s waiting time αi,k does
not change with time, a fixed defense interval provides the
same expected payoff between every two consecutive moves.
Moreover, since the defender’s problem is a convex optimiza-
tion problem, the optimal defending frequency for a given
attack strategy can be easily determined by solving the convex
program.
B. Attacker’s Best Response
We first analyze the attacker’s best response against any
deterministic defense strategy, then show that the i.i.d. strategy
is the best response against periodic defense.
Definition IV.3. An attack strategy is called independent non-
adaptive if it is non-adaptive, and Wi,k is independent across
i and k.
Lemma IV.3. When the defense strategies are deterministic,
for any attacker’s adaptive strategy, there always exists an
independent non-adaptive strategy, which gives the attacker
the same payoffs.
Proof. When the defense strategies are deterministic, we can
rewrite the attacker’s optimization problem (2) as follows
max
Wi,k
N∑
i=1
[
T · ri −
∑Li
k=1 E[min(Wi,k + αi,k, Xi,k)] · ri
T
−
∑Li
k=1 P (Wi,k < Xi,k) · C
A
i
T
]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
[∑Li
k=1E[min(Wi,k + αi,k, Xi,k)]
T
−
∑Li
k=1E[min(Wi,k, Xi,k)]
T
]
≤M
(9)
The proof is done as long as we can construct an independent
non-adaptive strategy W ′i,k such that for all i and k, we have
1) E[min(Wi,k+αi,k, Xi,k)] = E[min(W
′
i,k+αi,k, Xi,k)];
2) E[min(Wi,k, Xi,k)] = E[min(W
′
i,k, Xi,k)];
3) P (Wi,k < Xi,k) = P (W
′
i,k < Xi,k).
Since Xi,k is deterministic and αi,k is independent across i
and k, the expectation above is with respect to the marginal
distribution of Wi,k only. Thus, we can construct W
′
i,k whose
distribution is the same as Wi,k’s marginal distribution which
does not depend on any realization of Xj,τ and Wj,τ s.t.
Tj(τ) < Ti(k). Meanwhile, W
′
i,k is independent across i and
k.
According to Lemma IV.3, it suffices to consider indepen-
dent non-adaptive strategies when the defender uses determin-
istic strategies.
Lemma IV.4. When defense strategies are deterministic, the
attacker’s best response (among non-adaptive strategies) must
satisfy the following condition
W ⋆i,k =
{
0 w.p. pi,k
≥ Xi,k w.p. 1− pi,k
(10)
Proof sketch: The main idea of the proof is to divide the
problem (2) into N independent sub-problems, one for each
node, where each subproblem has a similar target function and
a budget Mi with
∑N
i=1Mi = M , as follows (note that we
consider an equivalent minimization problem by ignoring the
constant term ri in (2)).
min
αi,k
Li∑
k=1
E[min(Wi,k + αi,k, Xi,k)] · ri + P (Wi,k < Xi,k) · CAi
T
s.t.
Li∑
k=1
E[min(Wi,k + αi,k, Xi,k)]− E[min(Wi,k, Xi,k)]
T
≤Mi
(11)
Each sub-problem is further divided into Li independent
sub-problems with budget Mi,k where
∑Li
k=1Mi,k = Mi.
Due to the independence of nodes, it suffices to prove the
lemma for any of these sub-problems. The detailed proof is in
Section IX-A.
Lemma IV.4 implies that for each node i, the attacker’s
best strategy is to either attack node i immediately after it
realizes the node’s recovery, or gives up the attack until the
defender’s next move. There is no incentive for the attacker
to wait a small amount of time to attack a node before the
defender’s next move. The constraint M actually determines
the probability that the attacker will attack immediately. If M
is large enough, the attacker will never wait after defender’s
each move. We then find the attacker’s best responses when
the defender employs the periodic strategy.
Theorem IV.2. When the defender employs a periodic strat-
egy, the i.i.d. strategy is the attacker’s best response among
all strategies.
Proof. If the defender uses the periodic strategy where for
each i, Xi,k =
1
mi
, ∀k, (2) is a fractional knapsack problem
and all pi,k’s unit reward (payoff in target function divided
by weight in constraint) are equal. Thus, setting all pi,k in
(10) equal such that αi,k is i .i .d across i, is one of the
best solutions for (11) for any given Mi. Therefore, the i.i.d.
strategy is a best solution for (2) when the defender uses the
periodic strategy.
C. Markovian Strategies
Based on Theorem IV.1 and IV.2, the defender’s periodic
strategy and attacker’s i.i.d. strategy form a Nash equilibrium
among all adaptive and non-adaptive strategies. However, it is
still not clear what is the best response if the other player use
adaptive strategies and to the best of our knowledge, there has
been virtually no discussion about adaptive strategies in the
field of stealthy attacks. Further, even if the defender’s deter-
ministic strategy is optimal based on Lemma IV.1, there may
still exist other non-deterministic strategies that are optimal
and other Nash equilibria formed by adaptive strategies from
both players. In this section, we provide some preliminary
results in this direction. We consider a Markovian attacking
strategy and assume that the attacker’s waiting time Wi,k
follows Lemma IV.4. The attacker’s strategy pi,k for node i
is a discrete Markov chain across k. The Markov chain has
K states v1, v2, · · · , vK and transition matrix MAi . Mathe-
matically, we have P (pi,k+1 = vi|pi,k = vj) = MAi (i, j)
where MAi (i, j) is the entry in row i column j of matrix M
A
i .
7For tractability, we only consider the steady state. Thus, the
defender’s problem (1) now becomes the following
max
{Xi,k},Li
lim
T→∞
E
[ N∑
i=1
(
−
LiC
D
i + Tri
T
+
E[
∑Li
k=1(pi,kmin(αi,k, Xi,k) + (1 − pi,k)Xi,k)] · ri
T
)]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Li
T
≤ B w.p.1
Li∑
k=1
Xi,k ≤ T w.p.1 ∀i
(12)
In the target function of (12), the outer expectation is for
Xi,k and Li which are not necessarily deterministic. The
expectation in the numerator is with respect to the time-
average distribution of pi,k.
Theorem IV.3. If the attacker employs an ergodic Markovian
strategy, periodic strategy is defender’s best response.
Proof. When the attacker’s strategy is an ergodic markov
chain, the pi,k’s time-average distribution is the same as its
steady state distribution. Therefore the defender’s problem (12)
can be transferred to the following
max
{Xi,k},Li
lim
T→∞
E
[ N∑
i=1
(
−
LiC
D
i + Tri
T
+
(
∑Li
k=1 E[pi,k] min(αi,k, Xi,k) + (1− E[pi,k])Xi,k) · ri
T
)]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Li
T
≤ B w.p.1
Li∑
k=1
Xi,k ≤ T w.p.1 ∀i
(13)
where the expectation in the numerator is with respect to the
steady-state distribution of pi,k. (13) is the same as (1) if we
set
W ⋆i,k =
{
0 w.p. E[pi,k]
∞ w.p. 1− E[pi,k]
(14)
Here, E[pi,k] is the expected value of pi,k’s steady state
distribution. Therefore, based on Lemma IV.1, IV.2 and
Theorem IV.1, we know that the periodic strategy is defender’s
best response.
Theorem IV.3 tells us that the defender still prefers to use
periodic strategy when the attacker’s strategy space include
Markovian strategies. Consequently, the pair of periodic strat-
egy and i.i.d. strategy naturally forms the Nash equilibrium
under this circumstance. However, the i.i.d. attack strategy may
not be optimal against Markovian defending strategy.
Theorem IV.4. If the defender employs a Markovian strategy,
the i.i.d. attack strategy is not optimal in general.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume there is only one node and
the attacking time αi,k ∀i, k is deterministic. (We omit all the
subscript i in this proof since there is only one node and use
α to represent αi,k ∀k). The defender’s Markovian strategy
has two states x1 and x2 referring the two defending periods
whose transition probabilities are as follows: P (Xk+1 =
x2|Xk = x1) = u and P (Xk+1 = x1|Xk = x2) = v. Let pi1
and pi2 represent the probability that Xk = x1 and Xk = x2 in
steady state, respectively. We have pi1 =
v
u+v and pi2 =
u
u+v .
Since the attacker can observe the defender’ defending period,
the attacking strategy may depend on the defender’s state (the
previous defending period). We assume the attacker’s strategy
satisfies (10). Let p1 denote the attacking probability when
the attacker observes the defender using X1 in the previous
defense move, and p2 as the attacking probability for X2.
Mathematically, given Xk−1 = x1
Wk =
{
0 w.p. p1
∞ w.p. 1− p1
Given Xk−1 = x2
Wk =
{
0 w.p. p2
∞ w.p. 1− p2
We compute the average payoff for the attacker per defense
move. Given the defender uses x1 in the previous defense
move, the expected payoff for the attacker is S|Xk−1=x1 =
[(1 − u) · (x1 − α)p1 + u · (x2 − α)p1] · r − p1CA. If the
defender uses x2 in the previous defense move, the attacker’s
expected payoff is S|Xk−1=x2 = [vp2(x1−α)+(1−v)p2(x2−
α)] · r + p2CA. Here, we assume x1 ≥ α and x2 ≥ α. (The
defender has no incentive to set x1 or x2 smaller than α).
Further, since the Markov chain is time reversible, we also
have P (Xk−1 = x2|Xk = x1) = u and P (Xk−1 = x1|Xk =
x2) = v. For attacker’s budget constraint, we have
E[
∑Li
k=1 min(Wk + α,Xk)−min(Wk, Xk)]
T
=pi1 · E[min(Wk + α, x1)−min(Wk, x1)|Xk = x1]
+pi2 · E[min(Wk + α, x2)−min(Wk, x2)|Xk = x2]
=pi1 · (1− u)E[min(Wk + α, x1)−min(Wk, x1)|Xk−1 = x1]
+pi1 · uE[min(Wk + α, x1)−min(Wk, x1)|Xk−1 = x2]
+pi2 · vE[min(Wk + α, x2)−min(Wk, x2)|Xk−1 = x1]
+pi2 · (1− v)E[min(Wk + α, x2)−min(Wk, x2)|Xk−1 = x2]
=pi1[(1− u)p1α+ up2α] + pi2[(1− v)p2α+ vp1α]
=p1α[pi1(1 − u) + pi2v] + p2α[pi1u+ pi2(1− v)]
=(pi1p1 + pi2p2)α
Then, the attacker’s optimization problem becomes
max
p1,p2
pi1S|Xk−1=x1 + pi2S|Xk−1=x2
s.t. pi1p1 + pi2p2 ≤M/α
0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1
(15)
Since (15) is a fractional knapsack problem, there exists a
greedy method to find the optimal solution. Let ρ1 = [(1 −
u)x1+ux2−α]·r−C
A and ρ2 = [vx1+(1−v)x2−α]·r−C
A.
The greedy method is to allocate as much budget as possible to
pi whose ρi is bigger and then allocate the remaining budget
to the other pi until either all budget is used or p1 = p2 = 1.
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i.i.d. strategy is NOT the attacker’s optimal response against
Markovian defending strategy. Further, we can tell that ρ1 and
ρ2 refer to the expected payoffs for attacker when the defender
use x1 and x2 in the previous defense move respectively. The
optimal solution actually is to allocate budget based on the
attacker’s expected payoffs under different defending period
in the previous defense move.
Theorem IV.4 tells us the attacker may use an adaptive
strategy against the Markovian defending strategy. Compared
to the defender, since the attacker is able to observe the
defending period and the nodes’ state, the attacking strategy
may become state-dependent. Therefore, the pair of periodic
strategy and i.i.d. strategy is not the only one Nash equilibrium
among the space of both adaptive and non-adaptive strategies.
D. Simplified Optimization Problems
According to Theorem IV.1 and Theorem IV.2, periodic
defense and i.i.d. attack can form a pair of best-response
strategies with respect to each other. Consider such pairs
of strategies. Let mi ,
Li
T
= 1
Xi,k
, and let pi denote the
probability that Wi,k = 0, ∀k. By assuming that all attacking
time αi,k follows i.i.d. distribution across k, we omit the
subscript k for all αi,k. The optimization problems to the
defender and the attacker can then be simplified as follows.
Defender’s problem:
max
mi
N∑
i=1
[(
E[min (αi,
1
mi
)]piri − C
D
i
)
·mi − piri
]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
mi ≤ B
(16)
Attacker’s problem:
max
pi
N∑
i=0
pi ·
(
ri(1− E[min(αi,
1
mi
)] ·mi)− C
A
i mi
)
s.t.
N∑
i=0
E[min(αi,
1
mi
)] ·mi · pi ≤M
(17)
We observe that the defender’s problem is a continuous con-
vex optimization problem (see the discussion in Section IV-A),
and the attacker’s problem is a fractional knapsack problem.
Therefore, the best response strategy of each side can be
easily determined. Also, the time period T disappears in
both problems. It is worth mentioning that finding the Nash
Equilibrium of (16) - (17) is very challenging since the
constraint of (17) is non-convex with respect to mi, meaning
that the strategy space of this generalized Nash Equilibrium
problem (GNEP) is not jointly convex.
V. NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we study the set of Nash Equilibria of
the simplified game as discussed in Section IV-D where the
defender employs a periodic strategy, and the attacker employs
an i.i.d. strategy. Due to tractability, we further assume that
the attacking time αi,k is deterministic for all i and we omit
the subscript k since αi,k = αi,j ∀k, j. We show that this
game always has a Nash equilibrium and may have multiple
equilibria of different values.
We first observe that for deterministic αi, when mi ≥
1
αi
,
the defender’s payoff becomes −miCDi , which is maximized
when mi =
1
αi
. Therefore, it suffices to consider mi ≤
1
αi
.
Thus, the optimization problems (16) - (17) to the defender
and the attacker can be further simplified as follows.
For a given p, the defender aims at maximizing its payoff:
max
mi
N∑
i=1
[mi(riαipi − C
D
i )− piri]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
mi ≤ B
0 ≤ mi ≤
1
αi
, ∀i
(18)
On the other hand, for a given m, the attacker aims at
maximizing its payoff:
max
pi
N∑
i=1
pi[ri −mi(riαi + C
A
i )]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
miαipi ≤M
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i
(19)
For a pair of strategies (m, p), the payoff to the defender is
Ud(m, p) =
∑N
i=1[mi(piriαi−C
D
i )− piri], while the payoff
to the attacker is Ua(m, p) =
∑N
i=1 pi[ri −mi(riαi + C
A
i )].
A pair of strategies (m∗, p∗) is called a (pure strategy) Nash
Equilibrium (NE) if for any pair of strategies (m, p), we have
Ud(m
∗, p∗) ≥ Ud(m, p∗) and Ua(m∗, p∗) ≥ Ua(m∗, p). In the
following, we assume that CAi > 0 and C
D
i > 0. The cases
where CAi = 0 or C
D
i = 0 or both exhibit slightly different
structures, but can be analyzed using the same approach.
Without loss of generality, we assume ri > 0 and
CDi
riαi
≤ 1 for
all i. Note that if ri = 0, then node i can be safely excluded
from the game, while if
CDi
riαi
> 1, the coefficient of mi in
Ud (defined below) is always negative and there is no need to
protect node i.
Let µi(p) , piriαi − CDi denote the coefficient of mi in
Ud, and ρi(m) ,
ri−mi(riαi+C
A
i )
miαi
. Note that for a given p, the
defender tends to protect more a component with higher µi(p),
while for a givenm, the attacker will attack a component more
frequently with higher ρi(m). When m and p are clear from
the context, we simply let µi and ρi denote µi(p) and ρi(m),
respectively.
To find the set of NEs of our game, a key observation is that
if there is a full allocation of defense budget B to m such that
ρi(m) is a constant for all i, any full allocation of the attack
budget M gives the attacker the same payoff. Among these
allocations, if there is further an assignment of p such that
µi(p) is a constant for all i, then the defender also has no
incentive to deviate from m; hence (m, p) forms an NE. The
main challenge, however, is that such an assignment of p does
not always exist for the entire set of nodes. Moreover, there
are NEs that do not fully utilize the defense or attack budget
9as we show below. To characterize the set of NEs, we first
prove the following properties satisfied by any NE of the game.
For a given strategy (m, p), we define µ∗(p) , maxi µi(p),
ρ∗(m) , mini ρi(m), F (p) , {i : µi(p) = µ∗(p)}, and
D(m, p) , {i ∈ F : ρi(m) = ρ
∗(m)}. We omit m and p
when they are clear from the context.
Lemma V.1. In any NE, (1)mi ≤
ri
riαi+CAi
and (2) pi ≥
CDi
riαi
.
Proof. To prove the first property, suppose mi >
ri
riαi+CAi
.
Then pi must be 0; otherwise the benefit for attacking i
becomes negative. This in turn implies that mi = 0 by the
assumption that CDi > 0, a contradiction. To prove the second
property, suppose pi <
CDi
riαi
. Then we have µi < 0, which
implies mi = 0 and therefore pi = 1 since ri > 0, a
contradiction.
Lemma V.2. If (m, p) is an NE, we have (see Table III) :
1) ∀i 6∈ F,mi = 0, pi = 1, ρi =∞;
2) ∀i ∈ F\D,mi ∈ [0,
ri
αiri+CAi
], pi = 1;
3) ∀i ∈ D,mi ∈ [0,
ri
αiri+CAi
], pi ∈ [
CDi
riαi
, 1].
Proof. We first show that if mi > 0 and mj > 0, then
µi = µj . Suppose µi < µj . Then it is better to protect i
than protecting j. Since mi > 0, we must have mj =
1
wj
>
ri
riαi+CAi
by the assumption that CAi > 0, a contradiction. It
follows that mi = 0 ∀i 6∈ F and mi ∈ [0,
ri
riαi+CAi
] ∀i ∈ F .
Since when mi = 0, we must have ρi = ∞, and pi = 1,
pi = 1, ρi = ∞ ∀i 6∈ F . It remains to show that pi = 1 for
all i ∈ F\D. Assuming F\D 6= ∅, then we have ρj < ∞
for j ∈ D, which implies that mj > 0 for j ∈ D. Since
ρi < ρ
∗ for i ∈ F\D, it is more beneficial to attack i that any
j ∈ D. Since pj > 0 and mj > 0 for j ∈ D, we must have
pi = 1.
Lemma V.3. If (m, p) forms an NE, then for i ∈ D, j ∈ F\D
and k 6∈ F , we have riαi −CDi ≥ rjαj −C
D
j > rkαk −C
D
k .
Proof. Since µi = µj for i ∈ D and j ∈ F\D by the
definitions of F and D, and pi ≤ pj = 1 by Lemma V.2,
we have riαi − CDi ≥ µi = µj ≥ rjαj − C
D
j . On the
other hand, since µj > µk by the definition of F , and
pj = pk = 1 by Lemma V.2, we have rjwj − CDj = µj >
µk = rkwk − CDk .
According to the above lemma, to find all the equilibria of
the game, it suffices to sort all the nodes by a non-increasing
order of riαi − C
D
i , and consider each Fh consisting of the
first h nodes such that rhαh −CDh > rh+1αh+1 −C
D
h+1, and
each subset Dk ⊆ Fh consisting of the first k ≤ h nodes
in the list. In the following, we assume such an ordering of
nodes. Consider a given pair of F and D ⊆ F . By Lemma V.2
and the definitions of F and D, the following conditions are
TABLE III
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR NES
i ∈ D F\D F
mi [0,
ri
αiri+C
A
i
] [0, ri
αiri+C
A
i
] 0
pi [
CDi
riαi
, 1] 1 1
µi µ
∗ µ∗ < µ∗
ρi ρ
∗ > ρ∗ +∞
satisfied by any NE with F (p) = F and D(m, p) = D.
mi = 0, pi = 1, ∀i 6∈ F ; (20)
mi ∈ [0,
ri
αiri + CAi
], pi = 1, ∀i ∈ F\D; (21)
mi ∈ [0,
ri
αiri + CAi
], pi ∈ [
CDi
riαi
, 1], ∀i ∈ D; (22)∑
i∈F
mi ≤ B,
∑
i∈F
miαipi ≤M ; (23)
µi = µ
∗, ∀i ∈ F ; µi < µ
∗, ∀i 6∈ F ; (24)
ρi = ρ
∗, ∀i ∈ D; ρi > ρ
∗, ∀i 6∈ D. (25)
The following theorem provides a full characterization of
the set of NEs of the game.
Theorem V.1. Any pair of strategies (m, p) with F (p) = F
and D(m, p) = D is an NE iff it is a solution to one of the
following sets of constraints in addition to (20) to (25).
1)
∑
i∈F mi = B; ρ
∗ = 0;
2)
∑
i∈F mi = B; ρ
∗ > 0;
∑
i∈F miαipi = M ;
3)
∑
i∈F mi = B; ρ
∗ > 0; pi = 1, ∀i ∈ F ;
4)
∑
i∈F mi < B; µ
∗ = 0; F = FN ; ρ
∗ = 0;
5)
∑
i∈F mi < B; µ
∗ = 0; F = FN ; ρ
∗ > 0;∑
i∈F miαipi = M ;
6)
∑
i∈F mi < B; µ
∗ = 0; F = FN ; ρ
∗ > 0; pi = 1, ∀i ∈
F .
Proof. We first consider the cases when the budget constraint
of the defender is tight, i.e.,
∑
i∈F mi = B (cases 1-3). Since
mi ≤
ri
αiri+CAi
in any NE by Lemma V.1 and mi = 0 for i
not in F by Lemma V.2, we must have B ≤
∑
i∈F
ri
αiri+CAi
in any NE. If B =
∑
i∈F
ri
αiri+CAi
, we have ρ∗ = 0 (case
1). Assume B <
∑
i∈F
ri
αiri+CAi
. First consider the case D =
F . We then have mi ≤
ri
αiri+CAi
, i ∈ F . Hence, ρ∗ > 0
since B <
∑
i∈F
ri
αiri+CAi
. It follows that
∑
i∈F miαipi =M
(case 2) unless pi = 1, ∀i ∈ F (case 3); otherwise, some
pi, i ∈ F can be increased to get more benefit. Note that
case 3 can happen only if riαi − CDi is the same for all i ∈
F . Next consider the case D ( F . If B ∈ [
∑
i∈E
ri
αiri+CAi
,∑
i∈F
ri
αiri+CAi
), we again have ρ∗ = 0 and get case 1, but
with extra constraints regarding i ∈ F\D as required by (21)
and (22). Otherwise, if B <
∑
i∈D
ri
αiri+CAi
, by applying a
similar argument as above, we again have ρ∗ > 0 and get
case 2 or case 3 depending on whether the attacker’s budget
constraint is tight or not.
We next consider the cases when
∑
i∈F mi < B (cases 4-
6). We first observe that pi =
CDi
riαi
, ∀i ∈ F , or equivalently,
µ∗ = 0. Otherwise, if µi > 0, mi can be further increased
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to reduce the cost due to the fact that mi ≤
ri
riαi+CAi
< 1
αi
in any NE (by Lemma V.1 and the assumption that CAi >
0), a contradiction. We then have F = FN by its definition.
Cases 4-6 then follow from a similar argument for cases 1-3
by distinguishing different values of ρ∗.
In the following, NEs that fall into each of the six cases
considered above are named as Type 1 - Type 6 NEs, respec-
tively. The next theorem shows that our game has at least one
equilibrium and may have more than one NE.
Theorem V.2. The attacker-defender game always has a pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium, and may have more than one NE
of different payoffs to the defender.
Proof. To show the first part, for any given index h ≤ N ,
we define a pair of strategies (mh, ph) as follows. Let mhi =
0, ∀i > h and let {mhi , i ≤ h} be the solution to the constraints
(1)
∑
i≤hm
h
i = B and (2) ρi is a constant for all i ≤ h;
phi = 1, ∀i > h (hence µh+1 = rh+1αh+1 − C
D
h ), and ∀i ≤
h, phi =
µh+1+C
D
i
riαi
if h < N , phi = 0 otherwise.
We first prove the following claim. For a given h, let h′ ≤ h
denote the smallest index such that rh′αh′−CDh′ = rhαh−C
D
h .
Consider two pairs of strategies (mh, ph) and (mh
′
, ph
′
). We
claim that if
∑
i≤hm
h
i αip
h
i < M and
∑
i≤hm
h′
i αip
h′
i ≥
M , then there is a Type 2 NE respecting Fh. Note that by
definition,
∑
i≤hm
h
i αip
h
i < M is always true when h = N .
To prove the claim, we consider another pair of strategies
(mh, ph
′
). If we have
∑
i≤hm
h
i αip
h′
i ≥ M , then since∑
i≤hm
h
i αip
h
i < M , there must exist p with pi = 1, ∀i > h,
ph ∈ [
µh+1+C
D
h
rhαh
, 1], and pi =
µh+C
D
i
riαi
, ∀i ≤ h such that∑
i≤hm
h
i αipi = M . Hence, (m
h, p) is a Type 2 NE.
On the other hand, if
∑
i≤hm
h
i αip
h′
i < M , then since∑
i≤hm
h′
i αip
h′
i ≥M , there must exist m with mi = 0, ∀i >
h,mi ∈ [0,mhi ], ∀h
′ ≤ i ≤ h, and {mhi , i ≤ h} be the solution
to the constraints (1)
∑
i≤hm
h
i = B and (2) ρi is a constant
for all i < h′, such that
∑
i≤hmiαip
h′
i = M . We again get a
Type 2 NE.
We then prove the theorem. First note that if B ≥∑
i≤N
ri
αiri+CAi
, then there is a Type 1 or Type 4 NE in
FN . Assume B <
∑
i≤N
ri
αiri+CAi
. There is h < N such
that B <
∑
i≤h
ri
αiri+CAi
and B ≥
∑
i<h′
ri
αiri+CAi
, where
h′ is defined as above. If there is an NE with respect to
some F (h′′), h′′ > h, we are done. Otherwise, we have∑
i≤hm
h
i αip
h
i < M by the claim. If
∑
i≤hm
h
i αip
h′
i ≥ M ,
there is a Type 2 NE as proved above. Otherwise, consider
the pair of strategies (m′, ph
′
) where m′i = 0, ∀i > h,
mi =
ri
αiri+CAi
, ∀i < h′, and {mhi , i ≤ h} is the solution
to the constraints (1)
∑
i≤hm
h
i = B and (2) ρi is a constant
for all i < h′. If
∑
i≤hm
′
iαip
h′
i ≥ M , there is Type 2 NE.
Otherwise, there must be a Type 1 NE.
To show the second part, consider the following example
with two nodes where r1 = r2 = 1, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, C
D
1 =
1/5, CD2 = 4/5, C
A
1 = 1, C
A
2 = 7/2, B = 1/3, andM = 1/5.
It is easy to check that m = (1/6, 1/6) and p = (3/20, 9/10)
is a Type 2 NE, and m = (1/3, 0) and p = (p1, 1) with
p1 ∈ [1/5, 3/10] are all Type 1 NEs, and all these NEs have
different payoffs to the defender.
VI. SEQUENTIAL GAME
In this section, we study a sequential version of the simpli-
fied game considered in the last section. In the simultaneous
game we considered in the previous section, neither the
defender nor the attacker can learn the opponent’s strategy
in advance. While this is a reasonable assumption for the
defender, an advanced attacker can often observe and learn de-
fender’s strategy before launching attacks. It therefore makes
sense to consider the setting where the defender first commits
to a strategy and makes it public, the attacker then responds
accordingly. Such a sequential game can actually provide the
defender a higher payoff comparing to a Nash Equilibrium
since it gives the defender the opportunity of deterring the
attacker from moving. We assume that at t = 0, the leader (de-
fender) has determined its strategy, and the follower (attacker)
has learned the defender’s strategy and determined its own
strategy in response. In addition, the players do not change
their strategies thereafter. Our objective is to identify the best
sequential strategy for the defender to commit to, in the sense
of subgame perfect equilibrium [25] defined as follows. We
again focus on the case where αi is deterministic for all i.
Definition VI.1. A pair of strategies (m⋆, p⋆) is a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the simplified game (18) and (19) if m⋆
is the optimal solution of
max
mi
N∑
i=1
[mi(riαip
⋆
i − C
D
i )− p
⋆
i ri]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
mi ≤ B
0 ≤ mi ≤
1
αi
, ∀i
(26)
where p⋆i is the optimal solution of
max
pi
N∑
i=1
pi[ri −mi(riαi + C
A
i )]
s.t.
N∑
i=1
miαipi ≤M
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i
(27)
Note that in a subgame perfect equilibrium, p⋆i is still the
optimal solution of (19) as in a Nash Equilibrium. However,
defender’s best strategy m⋆i is not necessarily optimal with
respect to (18). Due to the multi-node setting and the resource
constraints, it is very challenging to identify an exact subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy for the defender. To this end, we
propose a dynamic programming based algorithm that finds a
nearly optimal defense strategy.
Remark VI.1. Since for any given defense strategy {mi}, the
attacker’s problem (27) is a fractional knapsack problem, the
optimal pi ∀i has the following form: Sort the set of nodes by
ρi(mi) =
ri−mi(riαi+C
A
i )
miαi
non-increasingly, then there is an
index k such that pi = 1 for the first k nodes, and pi ≤ 1 for
the k + 1-th node, and pi = 0 for the rest nodes. However,
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if ρi = ρj for some i 6= j, the optimal attack strategy is
not unique. When this happens, we assume that the attacker
always breaks ties in favor of the defender, a common practice
in Stackelberg security games [15].
Before we present our algorithm to this problem, we first
establish the following structural properties on the subgame
perfect equilibria of the game.
Lemma VI.1. In any subgame perfect equilibrium (m, p), the
set of nodes can be partitioned into the following four disjoint
sets according to the attack and defense strategies applied:
1) F = {i|mi > 0, pi = 1}
2) D = {i|mi > 0, 0 < pi < 1};
3) E = {i|mi > 0, pi = 0};
4) G = {i|mi = 0, pi = 1}.
Moreover, they satisfy the following properties:
1) F ∪D ∪E ∪G = {1, 2, ..., n} and |D| ≤ 1
2) ρi ≥ ρk ≥ ρj for ∀i ∈ F, k ∈ D, j ∈ E
Proof. It is obvious that F , D, E and G are disjoint. The three
properties follow directly from the structure of the optimal
solution to the attacker’s problem and the remark made above.
Since the set D has at most one element, we use md to
represent this element for simplicity, and let ρd = ρd(md). If
D is empty, we pick any node i in F with minimum ρi and
treat it as a node in D.
Lemma VI.2. For any given nonnegative ρd, the optimal
solution for (26)-(27) satisfy the following properties:
1) riαi − CDi > 0 ∀i ∈ F ∪E ∪D
2) mi ≤ mi ∀i ∈ F
3) mj = mj ∀j ∈ E
4) mi ≤
1
αi
∀i
5) B −
∑
i∈Emi −md > 0.
where mi = ρ
−1
i (ρd)
Proof. If riαi − CDi ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ F ∪ E ∪D. there is no point
for the defender to defend such node which will only make
the payoff even worse due to high defending cost. Thus, all
the nodes whose riαi − CDi ≤ 0 are only in set G. For ∀i ∈
F , ρi(mi) = ρd and ρi(mi) ≥ ρd. According to the reverse
relationship between ρ and mi, we have mi ≤ mi. For ∀j ∈
E, since ρj(mj) = ρd and ρj(mj) ≤ ρd, mj is actually a
lower bound for mj . Setting mj = mj makes the cost from
node i, which is miC
D
i gets its minimum and so does the
whole problem since it also uses the minimum budget from
B. Therefore, more budget can be allocated for mi i ∈ F to
minimize the cost from the nodes in set F . Further, it’s easy to
check mi is always less than
1
αi
for any given nonnegative ρd.
As to the 5th property, if B−
∑
i∈Emi−md ≤ 0, there is no
budget for nodes in set F and D, which means F and D are
both empty. According to the greedy method, it only happens
when M = 0 which violates our assumption. Therefore, B −∑
i∈Emi −md > 0.
Lemma VI.3. For all optimal solutions of (26)-(27), we
always have ρd ≥ 0
Proof. If ρd < 0, the defender can give a smaller budget to
the corresponding node to bring ρd down to 0. In any case, the
payoffs from nodes in sets D and E are 0 since the attacker
will give up attacking the nodes in sets D and E. Thus, the
defender has more budget to defend the nodes in sets F and
G which brings more payoff. Therefore ρd is always greater
than or equal to 0.
Based on Lemma VI.3, we only consider non-negative ρd
in the our analysis and algorithm.
Lemma VI.4. For any nonnegative ρd, there exists an optimal
solution for (26)-(27) such that ∀i ∈ F , there is at most ONE
mi < mi and all the other mi = mi
Proof. Suppose the set allocation and ρd are fixed, which
meansmd andmi ∀i are also fixed. According to Lemma VI.1
and Lemma VI.2, we can now convert (26)-(27) to the follow-
ing problem:
max
mi,i∈F
∑
i∈F
[mi(riαi − C
D
i )− ri]−
∑
i∈G
ri −
∑
i∈E
miC
D
i
+md(prdαd − C
D
i )− prd
s.t.
∑
i∈F
mi ≤ B −
∑
i∈E
mi −md
∑
i∈F
αimi + pαdmd ≤M
0 ≤ mi ≤ mi ∀i ∈ F
(28)
where p = min{1,
M−
∑
i∈F αimi
αdmd
}.
Case 1: If
M−
∑
i∈F αimi
αdmd
≤ 1, we put p =
M−
∑
i∈F αimi
αdmd
back into the target function of (28) and convert it to
max
mi,i∈F
∑
i∈F
[mi(riαi − C
D
i )− ri]−
∑
i∈G
ri −
∑
i∈E
miC
D
i
+
M −
∑
i∈F αimi
αdmd
rd(αdmd − 1)−mdC
D
d
s.t.
∑
i∈F
mi ≤ B −
∑
i∈E
mi −md
0 ≤ mi ≤ mi ∀i ∈ F
(29)
It is easy to see that (29) is a fractional knapsack problem.
Thus, there is at most one fractional variable which means at
most one mi < mi.
Case 2: If
M−
∑
i∈F αimi
αdmd
> 1, the attacker’s budget is not
fully utilized and all p⋆i in (26) equal to 1. Thus, the sets D and
E are empty. Now suppose there exist two nodes j and k in F
with mj < mj and mk < mk. Without loss of generality, by
assuming rjαj − CDj ≥ rkαk − C
D
k , we can always increase
the defender’s payoff by decreasing mk and increasing mj
until either mj = mj or mk = 0. If mk = 0, node k is in set
G. Here, if the attacker’s budget is fully utilized (as in Case
1), we can not guarantee the new payoff by decreasing mk
and increasing mj is always bigger, since αk may be much
smaller than αj , making the increase of mj is very small due
to limited attacker’s budget.
Above all, we can claim that there exists an optimal solution
with at most one node in set F with mi < mi.
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TABLE IV
NODES IN DIFFERENT SETS WITH GIVEN ρd
F E G
Defender’s
mi(riαi − C
D
i )− ri −miC
D
i −ripayoff
Defender’s
mi mi 0
budget usage
Attacker’s
miαi 0 0
budget usage
From the above lemmas, we can establish the following
results about the structure of the optimal solution for (26)-
(27).
Proposition VI.1. For any nonnegative ρd, there exists an
optimal solution {mi}ni=1 such that
1) ∀i ∈ F , there is at most one mi < mi and all the other
mi = mi;
2) md = md
3) ∀i ∈ E, mi = mi;
4) ∀i ∈ G, mi = 0.
According to Proposition VI.1, for any nonnegative ρd,
once the set allocation is determined, the value of mi can be
immediately determined for all the nodes except the only one
fractional node in set F . Meanwhile, we can explicitly list the
payoff, defender’s budget usage and attacker’s budget usage
by putting each node into different set as shown in Table IV.
We then propose the following algorithm to the defender’s
problem (see Algorithm 1). The algorithm iterates over all
possible node d in set D and all possible node f with
fractional assignment in set F . We first compute a special
case when set G is empty (line 2). In this case, the defender’s
optimal strategy can be obtained by solving (30) based on
Proposition VI.1 and Remark VI.1.
V al(d, f) =
max
ρd,pi,mf
∑
i6=f
mi(piriαi − C
D
i )− piri +mf (rfαf − C
D
f )− rf
s.t.
∑
i6=f
mi +mf ≤ B
∑
i6=f
pimiαi +mfαf ≤M
ρd =
ri −mi(riαi + CAi )
miαi
ρd ≥ 0, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, mf ≥ 0
(30)
The reason why we compute this special case first will become
clear in the proof of Theorem VI.1 where we bound the
performance guarantee of the algorithm. The algorithm then
iterates over nonnegative ρd with a step size ρstep (line 4).
Given ρd, d, f , the best set allocation (together with mi for all
i) are determined using dynamic programming as explained
below, where we first assume that B, M , mi and αi have
been rounded to integers for all i . The loss of performance
due to rounding will be discussed later.
For any given ρd, node d in set D, and node f with
fractional assignment in set F , we compute mi for all i (line
5). Let SEQ(i, b,m, d, f, ind) denote the maximum payoff
of the defender considering only node 1 to node i (excluding
nodes d and f ), for a given defender’s budget b ∈ [0, B] and
an attacker’s budget m ∈ [0,M ] . The parameter ind is a
boolean variable that indicates whether we can put nodes in
set E arbitrarily. If ind is True, any node (except nodes d and
f ) can be in set E. Otherwise, a node i can be allocated to set
E only if ri−mi(riαi+CAi ) ≤ 0. Equivalently, ind indicates
whether the attacker uses up all the budgetM . If ind is False,
there is still available budget for the attacker to attack other
nodes with a reward greater than 0. Thus, putting a node i with
ri−mi(riαi+CAi ) > 0 into set E violates the structure of the
greedy solution for (27). The value of SEQ(i, b,m, d, f, ind)
is determined recursively. If node i is either d or f , we simply
set SEQ(i, b,m, d, f, ind) = SEQ(i − 1, b,m, d, f, ind).
Otherwise, we have the following recurrence equation, where
the three cases refer to putting node i in sets F , E and G
respectively based on Table IV:
SEQ(i, b,m, d, f, ind) =
max


SEQ(i− 1, b−mi,m− αimi, d, f, ind)
+mi(riαi − CDi )− ri
SEQ(i− 1, b−mi,m, d, f, ind)−miC
D
i
SEQ(i− 1, b,m, d, f, ind)− ri
(31)
We have the following boundary conditions:
1) The recursion SEQ will return −∞ when i > 0 and (i)
m < 0, or (ii) b < 0, or (iii) m = 0 and ind = False;
2) SEQ(0, b,m, d, f, T rue) returns the solution to the
following problem (i.e., the total payoffs contributed by
nodes d and f ):
max
mf
mf (rfαf − C
D
f )− rf +md(prdαd − C
D
d )− prd
s.t. mf +md ≤ b
m−mdαd ≤ mfαf ≤ m
mf ≤ mf
p =
m−mfαf
αdmd
(32)
3) Similarly, SEQ(0, b,m, d, f, False) returns the solution
to the following problem:
max
mf
mf (rfαf − C
D
f )− rf +md(rdαd − C
D
d )− rd
s.t. mf +md ≤ b
mfαf ≤ m− αdmd
mf ≤ mf
(33)
Note that if the constraints in (32) or (33) define an
empty set for mf , SEQ simply returns −∞.
Since the dynamic program searches for all the possible
solutions that satisfy Proposition VI.1, the maximum value
of val′d,f,ρd and val
′
d,f,ρd
gives us the optimal solution of
(26)-(27) for any given nonnegative ρd, node d and f . Al-
gorithm 1 then computes the optimal solution by searching
all the nonnegative ρd, d and f . Note that d and f can
be equal to include the case that there is only one or zero
node in set F . The minimum possible value of ρ is 0
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Algorithm 1 Sequential Strategy for Defender
1: for d, f ← 1 to n do
2: Solve (30) to obtain V al(d, f)
3: ρmax ← ρ :
∑n
i=1 αimi(ρ) =M
4: for ρd ← 0 to ρmax with step size ρstep do
5: mi ← mi(ρd) for all i
6: val′d,f,ρd ← SEQ(n,B,M, d, f, T rue)
7: val′′d,f,ρd ← SEQ(n,B,M, d, f, False)
8: end for
9: Pdp(d, f)← maxρ{val′d,f,ρd , val
′′
d,f,ρd
}
10: end for
11: Palg ← maxd,f{Pdp(d, f), V al(d, f)}
(explained in Remark VI.3). The maximum possible value of
ρ is ρmax = {ρ :
∑n
i=1 αimi(ρ) = M}. If ρ ≥ ρmax, the
sum of all αimi will be less than M , meaning that all the
nodes will be in set F . In this case, the defender’s payoff is
maximized when ρ = ρmax.
Additionally, since the dynamic program searches over all
feasible integer values, we use a simple rounding technique
to guarantee it is implementable. Before the execution of
SEQ(n,B,M, d, f, ind), we set mi ←
⌊
mi
δ
⌋
, αi ←
⌊
αi
δ
⌋
for all i and B ←
⌊
B
δ
⌋
, M ←
⌊
M
δ
⌋
where δ is an adjustable
parameter. Intuitively, by making δ and ρstep small enough,
Algorithm 1 can find a strategy that is arbitrarily close to
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of the defender.
Formally, we can establish the following result.
Theorem VI.1. Let |Palg| denote the defender’s cost obtained
by Algorithm 1 and |P ⋆| the optimal cost. Given ρstep and the
rounding parameter δ, We have
|Palg |
|P⋆| ≤ 1+(ρstep+δ)O(N).
Please see its proof in Appendix (Section IX-B). Theo-
rem VI.1 provides the performance guarantee of Algorithm 1
and its proof also explains why we need to consider the special
case when set G is empty in Algorithm 1. If we don’t consider
such a special case separately, the approximation ratio would
be proportional to O(N2) instead of O(N).
Corollary VI.1. By setting both ρstep and δ with O(
1
N
),
Algorithm 1 can achieve a near-optimal solution and its
complexity is O(N5BM)
Proof. The complexity of the dynamic recursion SEQ(·) is
O(NBM) since SEQ(·) iterates all B, M and N . Algo-
rithm 1 iterates d and f with ρstep and rounding parameter
δ. Thus, its complexity is O(N
3BM
ρstep·δ
). By setting both ρstep
and δ with O( 1
N
), the total complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(N5BM).
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results for our game
models. For the illustrations, we assume that all the attacking
times αi are deterministic as in Sections V and VI. We study
the payoffs of both attacker and defender and their strategies in
both Nash Equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium in a
two-node setting, and study the impact of various parameters
including resource constraints B, M , and the unit value ri.
We further study the payoffs and strategies for both players in
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(c), and (d).
subgame perfect equilibrium in a five-node setting, and study
the impact of various parameters.
We first study the impact of the resource constraints M ,
B, and the unit value r1 on the payoffs for the two node
setting in Figure 2. In the figure, we have plotted both Type
1 and Type 5 NE 2 and subgame perfect equilibrium. Type 5
NE only occurs when M is small as shown in Figure 2(a),
while Type 1 NE appears when B is small as shown in
Figure 2(b), which is expected since B is fully utilized in a
Type 1 NE whileM is fully utilized in a Type 5 NE. When the
defense budget B becomes large, the summation of mi does
not necessarily equal to B and thus Type 1 NE disappears.
Similarly, the Type 5 NE disappears for large attack budget
M . In Figures 2(c) and 2(d), we vary the unit value of node
1, r1. At the beginning, the defender protects node 2 only
since α2 < α1. As r1 becomes larger and larger, the defender
starts to change its strategy by protecting node 1 instead of
node 2 in NE Type 1. On the other hand, since node 1 is fully
protected by the defender and the defender gives up defending
node 2, the attacker begins to attack node 2 with probability
1, and uses the rest budget to attack node 1 with probability
less than 1, due to the high defending frequency and limited
resourcesM . We further observe that in both the simultaneous
game and the sequential game, the value ofm1 increases along
with the increase of r1, while the value of m2 decreases at the
same time. This implies that that the defender tends to protect
the nodes with higher values more frequently. In addition, the
subgame perfect equilibrium always bring the defender higher
payoffs compared with Nash Equilibrium, which is expected.
Moreover, it it interesting to observe that under the Type 5
NE, the attacker’s payoff decreases for a larger M as shown
in Fig 2(a). This is because the defender’s budget B is not
fully utilized in Type 5 NE, and the defender can use more
budget to protect both nodes when M increases. The increase
of the attacker’s payoff by having a larger M is canceled by
the increase of the defender’s move frequency m1 and m2.
2There are also Type 2 NE, which are omitted for the sake of clarify.
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We also note that the Type 5 NE is less preferable for the
defender in Figure-2(c) when r1 is small and favors defender
as r1 increases, which tells us that the defender may prefer
different types of NEs under different scenarios and so does
the attacker.
We then study the effects of varying M and r1 on both
players’ payoffs and strategies in the sequential game for the
five-node setting. In Figure 3(a), the parameters of all the
nodes are the same except ri. We vary the attacker’s budget
M from 0 to 1. When M = 0, the defender can set mi for all
i to arbitrary small (but positive) values, so that the attacker
is unable to attack any node, leading to a zero payoff for both
players. As M becomes larger, the attacker’s payoff increases,
while the defender’s payoff decreases, and the defender tends
to defend the nodes with higher values more frequently, as
shown in Figure 3(a)(lower). After a certain point, the defender
gives up some nodes and protects higher value nodes more
often. This is because with a very large M , the attacker is
able to attack all the nodes with high probability, so that
defending all the nodes with small mi is less effective than
defending high value nodes with large mi. This result implies
that the attacker’s resource constraint has a significant impact
on the defender’s behavior and when M is large, protecting
high value nodes more frequently and giving up several low
value nodes is more beneficial for the defender compared to
defending all the nodes with low frequency.
In Figure 3(b), we vary r1 while setting other parameters
to be the same for all the nodes. Since all the nodes other
than node 1 are identical, they have the same mi as shown
in Figure 3(b)(lower). We observe that the defender protects
node 1 less frequently when r1 is smaller than the unit value
of other nodes. When r1 becomes larger, the defender defends
node 1 more frequently, which tells us the defender should
protect the nodes with higher values more frequently in the
subgame perfect equilibrium when all the other parameters
are the same.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a two-player non-zero-sum game
for protecting a system of multiple components against a
stealthy attacker where the defender’s behavior is fully ob-
servable, and both players have strict resource constraints. We
prove that periodic defense and non-adaptive i.i.d. attack are
a pair of best-response strategies with respect to each other in
the space of both adaptive and non-adaptive strategies. For this
pair of strategies, we characterize the set of Nash Equilibria
of the game, and show that there is always one (and maybe
more) equilibrium, for the case when the attack times are
deterministic. We further study the sequential game where the
defender first publicly announces its strategy, and design an
algorithm that can identify a strategy that is arbitrarily close
to the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for the defender.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma IV.4
Lemma IV.4. When defense strategies are deterministic, the
attacker’s best response (among non-adaptive strategies) must
satisfy the following condition
W ⋆i,k =
{
0 w.p. pi,k
≥ Xi,k w.p. 1− pi,k
(10)
Proof. In order to get the attacker’s best responses against any
defender’s deterministic strategies, we first divide (2) into N
sub-optimization problems
min
Wi,k
Li∑
k=1
E[min(Wi,k + αi, Xi,k)]ri + P (Wi,k < Xi,k)C
A
i
T
s.t.
Li∑
k=1
E[min(Wi,k + αi, Xi,k)]− E[min(Wi,k, Xi,k)]
T
≤Mi
(34)
where
∑N
i=1Mi = M . Note that here we consider the
equivalent minimization problem by taking the negative of the
target function of (2) and omitting the constant part. We further
divide each sub-problem into Li sub-problems as follows
min
Wi,k
E[min(Wi,k + αi, Xi,k)]ri + P (Wi,k < Xi,k)C
A
i
T
s.t.
E[min(Wi,k + αi, Xi,k)]− E[min(Wi,k, Xi,k)]
T
≤Mi,k
(35)
where
∑Li
k=1Mi,k = Mi. We claim that, the optimal solution
to (35) is to allocate as much budget as possible to P (Wi,k =
0), that is
W ∗i,k =
{
0 w.p. p∗i,k
≥ Xi,k w.p. 1− p∗i,k
(36)
where
p∗i,k =


min(1,
Mi,kT
E[min(αi,Xi,k)]
)
if ri(E[min(αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k) + CAi < 0
0 if ri(E[min(αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k) + CAi ≥ 0
(37)
The proof of the claim is provided below. Since Mi,k is any
number such that
∑Li
k=1Mi,k = Mi, the optimal solution
of (34) also satisfies the same structure of (36). A similar
argument also applies to the optimal solution of (2), although
the optimal pi,k are not necessarily the same as in (37). We
then prove our claim. For simplicity, we assume thatWi,k is a
discrete r.v., and without loss of generality, it has the following
p.m.f
Wi,k =


0 w.p. p0
v1 w.p. p1
...
vn w.p. pn
≥ Xi,k w.p. 1−
∑n
j=0 pj
(38)
where n ∈ N and vj ∈ R, j = 1, ..., n, such that 0 < v1 <
v2 < . . . < vn < Xi,k. We note that the following proof can
be adapted to the continuous Wi,k as well by replacing sums
with integrals and p.m.f with p.d.f.
From the definition of Wi,k, we have
E[min(Wi,k + αi, Xi,k)]
= p0E[min(αi, Xi,k)]
+
n∑
j=1
pjE[min(vj + αi, Xi,k)] + (1−
n∑
j=0
pj)Xi,k
= p0E[min(αi, Xi,k)]
+
n∑
j=1
pjE[min(αi, Xi,k − vj)] + (1−
n∑
j=0
pj)Xi,k +
n∑
j=1
pjvj
Problem (35) can then be converted to the following form
min p0(ri[E[min(αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k] + C
A
i )
+
n∑
j=1
pj(ri[E[min(vj + αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k] + C
A
i ) +Xi,kri
s.t. p0E[min(αi, Xi,k)] +
n∑
j=1
pjE[min(αi, Xi,k − vi)] ≤Mi,kT
n∑
j=0
pj ≤ 1
(39)
where we omit the constant T in the objective function for
simplicity. Let J({p0, ..., pn}) denote the objective function
in (39).
Since ri(E[min(αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k) +CAi < ri(E[min(vj +
αi, Xi,k)] − Xi,k) + C
A
i , if ri(E[min(αi, Xi,k)] − Xi,k) +
CAi ≥ 0, J({p0, ..., pn}) is minimized by setting pj =
0, ∀j = 0, ..., n, which implies Wi,k ≥ Xi,k w.p.1. Such
condition describes the case that even if the attacker attacks
the node immediately after it is recovered, its reward is
still less than 0. Therefore, the attacker never attacks. If
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ri(E[min(αi, Xi,k)] − Xi,k) + CAi < 0, we claim that the
optimal solution is to allocate as much budget Mi,kT as
possible to p0, that is, we set all pj = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
and p0 = min(1,
Mi,kT
E[min(αi,Xi,k)]
). This is clearly true if
ri(E[min(vj + αi, Xi,k)] − Xi,k) + CAi ≥ 0. Therefore,
it suffices to consider the case when ri(E[min(αi, Xi,k)] −
Xi,k) + C
A
i < ri(E[min(vj + αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k) + C
A
i < 0.
To prove the claim, consider an optimal
solution {p0, p1, ..., pn} to (39). We show that if
p0 < min(1,
Mi,kT
E[min(αi,Xi,k)]
), then we can find another
optimal solution {p′0, p
′
1, ..., p
′
n} such that p
′
0 > p0. We
distinguish the following two cases:
Case 1: p0E[min(αi, Xi,k)] +
∑n
j=1 pjE[min(αi, Xi,k −
vi)] < Mi,kT . Then by the optimality of {p0, p1, ..., pn} and
the assumption that ri(E[min(vj+αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k)+C
A
i < 0,
we must have
∑n
j=0 pj = 1. Let j ≥ 1 denote an index such
that pj > 0. Then there must exist a small amount △p > 0
such that p′0 = p0 +△p, p
′
j = p
′
j −△p, p
′
k = pk, ∀k 6= 0 and
k 6= j is again a feasible solution to (39). We further have
J({p0, ..., pn})− J({p
′
0, ..., p
′
n})
= △p(ri[E[min(vj + αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k] + C
A
i )
−△p(ri[E[min(αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k] + C
A
i )
= △pri(E[min(vj + αi, Xi,k)]− E[min(αi, Xi,k)])
≥ 0
Case 2: p0E[min(αi, Xi,k)] +
∑n
j=1 pjE[min(αi, Xi,k −
vi)] = Mi,kT . Again let j ≥ 1 denote an index such that pj >
0. Then there must exist a small amount △M > 0 such that
p′0 = p0 +
△M
E[min(αi,Xi,k)]
, p′j = p
′
j −
△M
E[min(αi,Xi,k−vj)]
, p′k =
pk, ∀k 6= 0 and k 6= j is a feasible solution to (39). We further
have
J({p0, ..., pn})− J({p
′
0, ..., p
′
n})
=
△M(ri[E[min(vj + αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k] + CAi )
E[min(αi, Xi,k − vj)]
−
△M(ri[E[min(αi, Xi,k)]−Xi,k] + CAi )
E[min(αi, Xi,k)]
=
△M
E[min(αi, Xi,k − vj)]
(rivj − riXi,k + C
A
i )
−
△M
E[min(αi, Xi,k)]
(−riXi,k + C
A
i )
≥ 0
B. Proof of Theorem VI.1
Theorem VI.1. Let |Palg| denote the defender’s cost obtained
by Algorithm 1 and |P ⋆| the optimal cost. Given ρstep and the
rounding parameter δ, We have
|Palg |
|P⋆| ≤ 1+(ρstep+δ)O(N).
Proof. If the set G is empty in the optimal solution P ⋆,
Algorithm 1 computes the optimal payoffs for the defender
by solving (30). Then, we have maxd,f V al(d, f) = P
⋆.
Therefore,
|Palg |
|P⋆| = 1.
If the set G is not empty in the optimal solution P ⋆, we
first consider the loss of performance due to ρstep. Denote
ρ⋆ as the optimal ρd for computing P
⋆ and ρ′ the first ρd
that is greater than ρ⋆ in Algorithm 1. Let m⋆i = mi(ρ
⋆)
and m′i = mi(ρ
′). Let |Pρ′ | refer to the total cost when ρ⋆
increases to ρ′ for the optimal solution P ⋆. By increasing ρ⋆
to ρ′, each m⋆i decreases to m
′
i and the total cost increases in
two parts. The first part is due to the decrease of m⋆i for all i
in F . The seconde part comes from sets E and D. Since m⋆i
decreases, the attacker has extra budget to attack the nodes in
sets E and D, moving these nodes to sets F and D. For all
sets F , D, E and G above, we refer to the set allocation in
optimal solution P ⋆. Let HF and HE denote the increase of
total cost from the two parts, respectively. We have
HF =
∑
i∈F
[
ri(1 −m
′
iαi) +m
′
iC
D
i − ri(1 −m
⋆
iαi)−m
⋆
iC
D
i
]
=
∑
i∈F
(m⋆i −m
′
i) · (riαi − C
D
i )
=
∑
i∈F
△mi(riαi − C
D
i )
where △mi = m
⋆
i −m
′
i.
Let p′d and p
⋆
d be the attacker’s attacking probability for the
node in set D under ρ′ and ρ⋆, respectively. Denote p′i as the
attacking probability for node i under ρ′. We have
HE =
∑
i∈E
[
p′iri(1−m
′
iαi) +m
′
iC
D
i −m
⋆
iC
D
i
]
+ p′drd(1−m
′
dαd) +m
′
dC
D
d − p
⋆
drd(1−m
⋆
dαd)−m
⋆
dC
D
d
≤
∑
i∈E∪D
p′iri(1−m
′
iαi)
(40)
Also note that p′i, i ∈ E ∪ D must satisfy the resource
constraint such that
∑
i∈E∪D
p′im
′
iαi ≤
N∑
i=1
△miαi (41)
where the right-hand side represents an upper bound on the
extra budget for nodes in sets E and D. From (40) and (41),
we have
HE ≤
N∑
i=1
△miαi ·max
i
{
ri(1− αim
′
i)
αim
′
i
}
We further have
△mi =
ri
(ρ⋆ + ri)αi + CAi
−
ri
(ρ′ + ri)αi + CAi
≤
(ρ′ − ρ⋆)riαi
[(ρ⋆ + ri)αi + CAi ][(ρ
′ + ri)αi + CAi ]
≤
ρstepriαi
[(ρ⋆ + ri)αi + CAi ][(ρ
′ + ri)αi + CAi ]
(42)
Since ρ′ is one of the ρd that Algorithm 1 iterates through, we
have |Palg| ≤ |Pρ′ |. Then, we can compute the approximation
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ratio as follows:
|Palg| − |P ⋆|
|P ⋆|
≤
|Pρ′ | − |P ⋆|
|P ⋆|
=
HF +HE
|P ⋆|
≤
∑
i∈F∪D△mi(riαi − C
D
i )
|P ⋆|
+
(
∑N
i=1△miαi) ·maxi{
ri(1−αim
′
i)
αim
′
i
}
|P ⋆|
≤
∑
i∈F∪D ρstep
riαi(riαi−C
D
i )
[(ρ⋆+ri)αi+CAi ]
2
|P ⋆|
+
(
∑N
i=1 ρstep
riα
2
i
[(ρ⋆+ri)αi+CAi ][(ρ
′+ri)αi+CAi ]
) ·maxi{ρ′ +
CAi
αi
}
|P ⋆|
≤ ρstep ·
( ∑
i∈F∪Dm
⋆
i
2(riαi − CDi )αi/ri∑
i∈F∪D[ri(1−m
⋆
iαi) +m
⋆
iC
D
i ]
+
∑N
i=1
riα
2
i
CAi ·C
A
i
·maxi
CAi
αi
+
∑N
i=1
riαi
(ρ⋆+ri)αi+CAi∑
i∈G ri
)
≤ ρstep
(
max
i
{
m⋆iαi(riαi − C
D
i )
riCDi
}
+
N maxi
riαi
CAi
maxi
αi
CAi
maxi
CAi
αi
+N maxi
riαi
CAi
mini ri
)
≤ ρstep

max
i
{
αi
CDi
}+N
maxi
riαi
CAi
(1 + maxi
αi
CAi
maxi
CAi
αi
)
mini ri


≤ ρstep · O(N)
(43)
A similar argument can be used to bound the loss of perfor-
mance due to rounding parameter δ. The only difference is the
decrease of m⋆i which satisfies △mi ≤
ρstepriαi
[(ρ⋆+ri)αi+CAi ]
2 + δ.
The rest is very similar to (43). It follows that
|Palg |
|P⋆| ≤
1 + (ρstep + δ)O(N) as desired.
